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SIGNIFICANCE, OUTCOMES, AND RATIONALE 
 
Fisnik Korenica1 and Dren Doli2
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article discusses the issue of constitutional rigidity 
from the perspective of the Constitution of Kosovo.  At the out-
set, the article analyzes the amendment procedure within the 
Constitution and its nature in terms of the actors and proce-
dures involved.  Next, the article questions the nature of con-
stitutional rigidity in Kosovo and seeks to address the position 
of veto players.  Arguing that the Constitution of Kosovo is ra-
ther rigid, the article then questions the significance of consti-
                                                 
1 Fisnik Korenica is a lecturer on the “Theory of State and Law” at the 
University of Prishtina and a Senior Research Fellow at the Group for Legal 
and Political Studies.  The paper is written as part of the Group for Legal and 
Political Studies’ research project “Assessing Democracy in the Western Bal-
kans.”  The authors thank the Group for Legal and Political Studies’ Re-
search Committee for providing in-depth comments and recommendations on 
the first draft. 
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tutional rigidity in light of the model of separation of powers, 
human rights, and the Constitutional Court’s constitutional 
“updating” role.  The article concludes that constitutional rigid-
ity in Kosovo offers a rather authoritative role to the Constitu-
tional Court, allowing it to address the issue of the scope and 
substance of the Constitution through its own case law.  
KEYWORDS 
Kosovo – Constitution – Constitutional Rigidity – Separa-
tion of Powers – Human Rights Instruments – Constitutional 
Court. 
INTRODUCTION 
The stability of constitutional regimes and the overall per-
formance of constitutional systems are often regarded as con-
sequences of constitutional rigidity.  Though many argue that 
constitutional systems that are regarded as rigid face problems 
because of the dynamism of societal and political affairs, the 
view that constitutional rigidity is nevertheless hugely signifi-
cant in certain processes is true and widely accepted.  There-
fore, constitutional rigidity is a rather important factor within 
a constitutional system and certain constitutional regimes in 
the world regard their rigid nature as important to their feasi-
bility and performance. 
Constitutional rigidity is a phenomenon that illustrates 
how “tough” it is to amend a constitution.  Therefore, rigid con-
stitutions are those that have tough amending procedures, as 
opposed to flexible constitutions, which could be amended easi-
ly and through “flexible” procedures.  A rigid constitution, how-
ever, produces many results, most importantly, the “stiffness” 
to use the political tools for overcoming constitutional provi-
sions. As such, constitutional rigidity is often regarded as a 
counter-balance for political actions that tend to make constitu-
tional provisions comply with the political needs of a country or 
partisan interests. However, on the other hand, certain scho-
lars would nevertheless argue that constitutional rigidity di-
minishes the chances of making constitutional provisions comp-
ly with reality and satisfy societal needs. To begin, this article 
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approaches the notion of constitutional rigidity by conceptualiz-
ing it as a double-faced phenomenon, namely the rigidness of 
amending the constitution and the great influence of constitu-
tional courts’ rulings, which remain practically unaffected by a 
“revenge” constitutional amendment or legislative battle.3
This article discusses a number of issues related to rigidity 
in the Constitution of Kosovo, making the topic quite appealing 
and novel. Most particularly, the article explores four issues: 
first, the rigidity of the Constitution of Kosovo, second, the re-
lationship between the Constitution’s rigidity and the model of 
separation of powers set by it, third, the importance of consti-
tutional rigidity in face of constitutional human rights, and 
fourth, constitutional rigidity in the face of the Constitution’s 
dynamic interpretation.  
  
Most would agree that the international state-building 
process in Kosovo has ended up with an internationally super-
vised constitutional drafting process.4  Though the domestic po-
litical elites, from almost every ethnicity,5 have been 
represented and have “written” the Constitution of Kosovo, one 
can argue that the latter is a product of the Ahtisaari Settle-
ment and the overall international state-building efforts over 
Kosovo.6
                                                 
3 See AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT FORMS AND 
PERFORMANCE IN THIRTY-SIX COUNTRIES 219, 223 (1999), available at 
http://yalepress.yale.edu/yupbooks/excerpts/lijphart_patterns.pdf. 
 Therefore, the Constitution of Kosovo’s rationale is 
4 See John Tunheim, Rule of Law and the Kosovo Constitution, 18 MINN. 
J. INT’L. L. 371, 376-78 (2009). 
5 See President’s Proclamation Appointing the Constitution Commission 
of the Republic of Kosovo (Feb. 19, 2008), available at 
http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/VENDIMI_I_PRESIDENT
IT_per_KKK_ENG.pdf. 
6 For more information on the certification of the Kosovo Constitution, 
see generally Press Release, Secretariat of Constitutional Commission, Gov-
ernment of Kosovo, Draft Constitution of Republic of Kosovo is Certified (Apr. 
2, 2008), available at http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/?cid=2,203,1316&-
tpl=news.php (demonstrating Peter Faith’s decision on the certification of the 
Kosovan Constitution).  Press Release, International Civilian Office, Second 
Meeting of the International Steering Group (ISG) for Kosovo (Apr. 17, 2008), 
¶ 4, available at http://www.ico-kos.org/pdf/17%20April%202008%20-
Vienna.pdf (discussing the certification of the Constitution).  For more infor-
mation on the Ahtisaarian Settlement process, see generally HENRY H. 
PERRITT, THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE FOR KOSOVO: A CHRONICLE OF THE 
AHTISAARI PLAN (2009) (explaining how Kosovo became an independent state 
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based on an international design for Kosovo, which was aimed 
at building a multiethnic state of Kosovo.7 Given this, most of 
the choices forced by internationals within the constitutional 
drafting process in Kosovo have been aimed at building protec-
tion mechanisms for the ethnic minorities in Kosovo, and sus-
taining the overall multiethnic character of the polity.8 In view 
of the latter, the character of Kosovo’s Constitution, in terms of 
the amending model, follows the same rationale.9
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGIDITY AND THE KOSOVO 
CONSTITUTION  
 This article 
will begin with a discussion of the Kosovo Constitution’s 
amendment process.  
 
The British constitutional system illustrates the most flex-
ible “constitution” in the world. In fact, the doctrine of “parlia-
mentary sovereignty,” the principle governing the constitution-
al system of United Kingdom, allows the UK Parliament to 
pass an amendment to the constitution by adopting a law with 
a simple majority of votes.  Moreover, there is no British court 
that could question the constitutionality of laws passed by the 
UK Parliament, which is logically fashioned by the British con-
stitutional model.  As such, the British example is in opposition 
to “constitutional rigidity.”  
With the British system in mind, the constitutional sys-
tems of other countries can be compared in order to understand 
                                                                                                             
and providing a broader view on the Ahtisaarian settlement process).  For 
more information on the state-building process in Kosovo, see generally INT’L 
CRISIS GRP., KOSOVO’S FRAGILE TRANSITION, EUROPE REPORT NO. 196 (Sep. 25, 
2008), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/196_kos-
ovos_fragile_transition.ashx (discussing the state-building process in Kosovo). 
7 See, e.g. Colin Warbrick, Kosovo: The Declaration of Independence, 57 
COMP. L.Q. 675 (2008). 
8 See generally Joseph Marko, The New Kosovo Constitution in a Region-
al Comparative Perspective, 33 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 437 (2008); MARC 
WELLER, CONTESTED STATEHOOD: KOSOVO’S STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE 
(2009). 
9 The European Commission argues that the Constitution of Kosovo is a 
constitution of a high European standard, see generally Commission Staff 
Working Document, Kosovo (under UNSCR 1244/99) 2008 Progress Report, 
SEC (2008) 2697 working doc. (May 11, 2008). 
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their constitutional amendment processes. One can argue that 
the constitutional amendment process depends on the model of 
the state governed by the constitution in question.  This means 
that federal states have largely different approaches for 
amending a constitution when compared to unitary states.  In 
fact, one could argue that federal constitutions are per se more 
difficult to amend than unitary states’ constitutions.  
In principle, there are three models of constitutional 
amendment: 1) constitutional amendment solely through a 
simple majority in parliament, 2) constitutional amendment 
through interaction between parliament and the people 
through a referendum, and 3) constitutional amendment by 
combining double majorities and/or supermajorities in the par-
liament, delays, thresholds, etc.   
The first model of constitutional review belongs to the 
“flexible” models of constitutional amending and this article 
will thus not discuss this category further.  Surely, the British 
example fits within this model. The second model reflects a 
model of constitutional rigidity since the constitutional 
amendment could be undertaken only if a majority in parlia-
ment has provided the endorsement, and the people through a 
referendum have agreed.10 In this case, the rigid nature of the 
constitutional amendment would have both political legitimacy 
deriving from parliament, and popular legitimacy deriving 
from the people’s say in the referendum.  There are a number 
of models under the third method, however, which combine 
mainly institutional and threshold elements in the constitu-
tional amendment process.  Such examples could include the 
double majority in a two-chamber parliament, the qualified 
majority of two-thirds or four-fifths in a single-chamber par-
liament, the qualified majority (of any kind) in parliament (one 
or more chambers) plus the endorsement of the people or the 
president, etc.11
                                                 
10 For examples from the American states’ constitutions and how the 
popular say hampers the constitutional amendment process or the proposed 
amendment itself, see generally Charles V. Laughlin, A Study in Constitu-
tional Rigidity I, 10 U. CHI. L. REV. 142 (1943). 
  
11 For further information on the various models of constitutional 
amendment and the steps that can make a constitution rigid, see JON ELSTER, 
ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND 
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Prior to embarking on an analysis of the Kosovo perspec-
tive, this article will provide some examples of constitutional 
amendment models.12
the Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it 
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on 
the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several 
States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, 
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, 
as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of 
three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three 
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may 
be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment 
which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hun-
dred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth 
Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no 
State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage 
in the Senate.
  The US Constitution, a federal state 
constitution, provides several methods of amendment. With re-
gard to the amendment process, the United States Constitution 
states:  
13
Based on Article V of the US Constitution, one can say that 
this instrument could be changed in many ways.  Most impor-
tantly, the initiative for commencing the amendment procedure 
belongs to both to Congress and the States’ legislatures.  Con-
gress nor the States have a monopoly over the initiation of the 
amendment process.  Approval of amendments rests with the 
individual States.  On the other hand, a close examination of 
the above-mentioned article, shows that it prohibits the 
amendment of some articles and sections of the Constitution.  
For instance, Article V prohibits a constitutional amendment 
touching issues such as the prohibition of equal suffrage by the 
States in the Senate.  Therefore, this leads to the idea that 
through Article V, the US Constitution establishes a hierarchy 
  
                                                                                                             
CONSTRAINTS 101 (2000);  LIJPHART, supra note 3, at 219;  JAN-ERIK LANE, 
CONSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL THEORY 114 (1996). 
12 Many provide evidence that almost all constitutions in the world pos-
sess articles that allow partial or total change of the constitution, see general-
ly HENC VAN MAARSEVEEN & GER VAN DER TANG, WRITTEN CONSTITUTIONS: A 
COMPUTERIZED COMPARATIVE STUDY (1978). 
13 U.S. CONST. art. V.  
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between the constitutional norms themselves and prohibits 
constitutional amendments that would affect issues concerning 
equal suffrage of the States in the Senate.  Article V demon-
strates that the people are neither directly allowed to partici-
pate, for example through a referendum, in the initiation of the 
constitutional amendment nor adoption processes.  Still, the 
amendment process is quite difficult and complex.  As such, the 
three issues posed by Article V of the US Constitution will be 
analyzed within the context of the Constitution of Kosovo 
amending procedure also. 
If France is taken as an example, two approaches could be 
followed in order to amend that country’s constitution.  The 
first method is to obtain a majority of votes in both chambers of 
the French Parliament and a majority of the people’s votes in a 
referendum.  The second method is to attain a two-thirds of 
vote in a joint plenary session of both chambers of Parliament 
with no need for a referendum required.14 France’s Constitu-
tion also sets forth that the decision of whether to place a con-
stitutional amendment in a referendum rests with the Presi-
dent even though it might have been endorsed through the 
second method discussed above.  Regarding the hierarchy of 
norms within the Constitution, the French Constitution states 
that the “republican form” of government cannot be amended 
in any way.15
In Switzerland, one would be able to speak for special ma-
jorities.  Amendments to the Swiss Constitution require the 
approval of not only a majority of the Swiss people by referen-
dum, but also of the majority of the cantons.  More specifically, 
“[t]he half-cantons are given half weight in the canton-by-
canton calculation; this means that, for instance, a constitu-
  Therefore, it is implied that an amendment of 
the French Constitution is not directly up to the people and 
that it might be amended within the parliamentary framework 
only.  Additionally, it is clear that the prohibition to changing 
the republican form of government reflects the superiority the 
constitutional norm regulating that issue has in the French 
Constitution.   
                                                 
14 See LIJPHART, supra note 3, at 222. 
15 Carl J. Friedrich, The New French Constitution in Political and Histor-
ical Perspective, 72 HARV. L. REV. 801, 835 (1959). 
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tional amendment can be adopted by 13.5 cantons in favor and 
12.5 against.”16
Having discussed some of the prevailing approaches to 
amending a constitution, let us embark on analyzing the 
process as laid down in the Constitution of Kosovo.  
  
In the main body of the Kosovo Constitution the following 
about sovereignty and its sources, is proclaimed “the sovereign-
ty of the Republic of Kosovo stems from the people, belongs to 
the people and is exercised in compliance with the Constitution 
through elected representatives, referendum and other forms 
in compliance with the provisions of this Constitution.”17
As far as Article 2.1 of the Constitution of Kosovo is con-
cerned, one can say that since the source of sovereignty rests 
with the people, then they are the only ones that can amend 
the Constitution.  However, Article 2.1 makes it clear that, 
even though the Constitution recognizes the people as the 
source of sovereignty, it paves the way for allowing indirect 
methods of constitutional amendment by the people.  In fact, 
since the Constitution of Kosovo proclaims that sovereignty can 
be exercised both through referendum and elected representa-
tives, one could argue that the constitutional amendment 
process is brought “outside” the direct control of the people.  
Logically, the counter-popular elements in the amendment pro-
cedure of the Constitution of Kosovo are consequently compli-
mentary with Article 2.1.  On the other hand, Article 2.1 does 
not restrict or prohibit the people’s direct participation in the 
exercise of sovereignty, for example, through the constitutional 
amendment process, but it does nevertheless pave the way for 
another method, that of exercising sovereignty through repre-
sentatives. 
 
The first question relating to the amendment process is, 
who and how many actors can initiate the procedure concerned.  
Article 144.1 of the Kosovo Constitution authorizes three actors 
to initiate the constitutional amendment process, namely, the 
Government, the President of Republic, and one fourth of 
                                                 
16 LIJPHART, supra note 3 at 40.  
17 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO June 15, 2008, art. 2, §1, 
available at http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Constitution.-
of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf. 
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Members of Parliament (MPs).  With Article 144.1 in mind, one 
can make at least two arguments.  First, institutional actors 
have a monopoly over the initiation of an amendment to the 
Kosovo Constitution.  Since there is no room for popular initia-
tives for amending the Constitution, one could argue that the 
initiative on the constitutional amendment process in Kosovo is 
closed off to direct participation by the people and biased 
against them.  Moreover, since only three institutional actors 
are authorized to raise the issue or initiate the constitutional 
amendment process, we argue that the control over the initia-
tion of the constitutional amendment process is rather monopo-
listic in institutional terms also.  Second, the initiative on con-
stitutional amendment is rather biased and no pluralistic 
ground can be found in it.  As will be argued below, the model 
of separation of powers established by the Kosovo Constitution 
allows the government and the President of Republic to belong 
to one governmental coalition as practice so illustrates.18
                                                 
18 See Fisnik Korenica & Dren Doli, Calling the Kosovo’s Constitution: A 
Legal Review, 22 DENNING L.J. 51, 63 (2010) (Eng.). 
  
Though one-fourth of MPs is a small number of votes to allow a 
parliamentarian vibrant ground to initiating constitutional 
amendments for even small political parties in the Parliament, 
one can argue that the MPs are usually party members and fol-
low partisan interests.  Hence, the right to initiate the amend-
ment of the Kosovo Constitution rests with partisan members 
and interests overall and no independent and/or non-partisan 
institution, for example, the ombudsperson, can be part of the 
initiative concerned.  We argue that the initiative to amend the 
Constitution is a monopoly of institutional actors on the one 
hand, and partisan members on the other, though one can 
speak for a partisan-plural ground when it comes to the small 
number of MPs allowed to initiate the amendment process.  
With this in mind, one can argue that the right on initiating a 
constitutional amendment requires a rigid procedure, when 
considering that popular initiatives and independent institu-
tions are not authorized to initiate it.  The opposite is true 
when the issue is seen from a political perspective since the in-
itiative can come so flexibly from political institutions. Hence, 
when taken as a whole, the counter-popular character of the 
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right in initiating a constitutional amendment follows the con-
stitutional rationale for “restraining” popular initiatives and 
the rule of majority, that is common to consociational constitu-
tional regimes.  This will be further supported with the argu-
ments and analysis depicting the adoption of constitutional 
amendment proposals shown below.   
To dig deeper into the question of the amendment process 
and in order to argue whether the Kosovo Constitution is flexi-
ble or rigid, we quote Article 144.2, the constitutional article 
describing the amendment process: 
[a]ny amendment shall require for its adoption the approval of 
two thirds (2/3) of all deputies of the Assembly including two 
thirds (2/3) of all deputies of the Assembly holding reserved or 
guaranteed seats for representatives of communities that are not 
in the majority in the Republic of Kosovo. 19
Article 144.2 is the only part in the Kosovo Constitution 
that explicitly regulates the issue of the adoption of constitu-
tional amendments.  Article 144.2 establishes a number of 
principles regarding the model the amendment process of the 
Kosovo Constitution follows in terms of the debate between ri-
gidity and flexibility.  In view of Article 144.2, one can come up 
with at least four arguments.
   
20
First, Article 144.2 introduces an amendment process that 
is more than a requirement for a simple majority.  In contrast 
to the flexible British Constitution, the Kosovo Constitution 
can be amended through a parliamentary route only. Two-
thirds of MPs, in fact, is quite a high bar to clear in Parliament, 
and it would represent a rather wide compromise.  Hence, 
through a simple calculation, two-thirds of the overall member-
ship of Parliament is equal to 80 MPs or 66.6 percent. 
 
Second, in view of Article 144.2, the adoption of a constitu-
                                                 
19 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO June 15, 2008, art. 144, §2, 
available at http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Constitut-
ion.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf.  
20 Many constitutions in Europe follow the same constitutional amend-
ment process, namely amendment of the constitution through parliament, 
see, e.g., 1994 CONST. art. 195 (Belg.);  C.E, B.O.E. n. 167/8, Dec. 29, 1978 
(Spain); BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [BV-G][CONSTITUTION] BGBl No. 
1/1930, as last amended by Bundesverfassungsgesetz [BVG] BGBl I No. 
2/2008 art. 44 (Austria). 
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tional amendment to the Kosovo Constitution requires a double 
supermajority.  Hence, the double majority, which consists of 
both a two-third majority of Parliament and a two-third major-
ity of the ethnic minority MPs in Parliament, is a rather high 
bar for the adoption of a constitutional amendment.   
By digging deeper into the issue of double majorities, one 
can bring an interesting argument.21 First, concerning the en-
tire parliamentary two-third majority (the first supermajority 
required), a two-third majority is somewhat beyond the number 
of MPs required to build a coalition government.22
                                                 
21 To increase the rigidity of this amendment procedure, the constitution 
drafters could have used the “delay” device in the amendment procedure.  
However, with the current regulation, the amendment procedure cannot be 
delayed, which suggests that the amendment can be adopted within minutes, 
if the votes taken satisfy the requirement set forth in the provision con-
cerned.  For more information on the “delay” device in the amendment 
process, see ELSTER, supra note 11, at 143.  Some constitutions require that in 
order for an amendment to be adopted, it must take the supermajority in two 
legislatures, namely, take the vote in the parliament existing under the cur-
rent mandate, and the parliament that will be made with the coming elec-
tion. 
 In this con-
text, an absolute majority in Parliament (50 percent + one) 
could appoint both the Government and the President of Re-
public in the final process.  Hence, logically and politically, a 
governmental coalition would never be close or equal to two-
thirds of MPs.  With this in mind, the first majority required to 
adopt a constitutional amendment, seeks to set forth a parlia-
mentary bar or threshold that exceeds the coalition of parties 
that usually hold the Government.  Therefore, as far as a ma-
jority of two-thirds of the votes in Parliament is required for 
the adoption of a constitutional amendment, a coalition gov-
ernment would not be able to satisfy this condition alone, at 
least logically and practically, even though the idea of having a 
coalition government consisting of two-thirds of MPs is not im-
possible.  To this extent, the supermajority of two-thirds of Par-
liament, required to pass a constitutional amendment could not 
be a monopoly of the ruling coalition government.  Instead, a 
broader consensus, with parties that stand outside the coalition 
government is needed.  Second, concerning the two-thirds of 
minority MPs required to pass a constitutional amendment 
22 See Korenica & Doli, supra note 18, at 84-85. 
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(the second supermajority required), it represents a superma-
jority that is both broad and rather inclusive in terms of ethnic 
minorities represented in the Kosovo Parliament.23 A two-
thirds majority of ethnic minority MPs, in fact, exceeds the 
number of seats that Serbs alone have in the current composi-
tion of Parliament.  It means that, a two-thirds majority at the 
level of ethnic minority MPs is not a monopoly of Serbian MPs 
alone, with Serbs being the largest ethnic minority in Kosovo.  
This, therefore, suggests that the two-thirds minority MPs’ 
vote in Parliament is neither a prerogative of one ethnic com-
munity’s MPs, say Serbian MPs, nor an easily reachable bar 
from the perspective of other ethnic communities’ MPs.24 How-
ever, can the Kosovo Parliament remain without any ethnic 
minority MP and dismiss the supermajority required?  No, the 
Kosovo Constitution offers twenty reserved seats for ethnic mi-
nority MPs, regardless of the popular vote results.25 The model 
of constitutional amendment provided by the provision con-
cerned follows a power-sharing rationale, as does the entire 
Kosovo Constitution.26
Third, Article 144.2 allows no room for popular say in the 
adoption of an amendment proposal.  The adoption of a consti-
tutional amendment cannot be put to a referendum or in any 
 
                                                 
23 There are twenty reserved seats for ethnic minority representatives. 
The international community has these seats be reserved, one could say, see 
JAMES HUGHES, CONFERENCE PAPER, COMPARING THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT 
MODEL IN THE ‘SUI GENERIS’ CASES OF NORTHERN IRELAND AND KOSOVO at 13 
(Sep. 10-12, 2009), available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/26061/.  There are 
three ethnic minority parliamentary groups in Kosovo’s Assembly currently 
with more than 20 MPs, see Republic of Kosovo Assembly, Numerical Repre-
sentation of the Kosovo Assembly, http://www.assembly-kosova.org/?-
cid=2,107 (last visited Jan. 23, 2011).  
24 See generally Oisin Tansey, Kosovo Independence and Tutelage, 20 J. 
DEMOCRACY 153 (2009); GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO PLAYERS: HOW POLITICAL 
INSTITUTIONS WORK (2002). 
25 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO June 15, 2008, art. 64, 
available at http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Constitut-
ion.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf. 
26 See generally Korenica & Doli, supra note 18; see also AREND LIJPHART, 
THE POLITICS OF ACCOMMODATION: PLURALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE 
NETHERLANDS (1968);  AREND LIJPHART, THINKING ABOUT DEMOCRACY: POWER-
SHARING AND MAJORITY RULE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2008). 
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other type of direct popular decision making.27  Hence, closing 
off the amendment adoption process to popular participation 
gives Parliament a monopoly over the constitutional amend-
ment process and makes it a prerogative of political parties’ 
representatives in Parliament.  At the same time, however, be-
sides promoting a monopoly belonging to Parliament, Article 
144.2 weakens the likelihood of upholding the principle of rule 
of majority.  Since this model of amendment with a double su-
permajority reflects a possibility for veto from the ethnic mi-
nority’s MPs in Parliament, adding that people are prohibited 
to give a say in the adoption process, this results in the adop-
tion of a constitutional amendment being in opposition to the 
principle of rule of majority.  With this in mind, the constitu-
tional rigidity provided by Article 144.2 is a counter-
majoritarian mechanism,28 which nevertheless provides an 
ethnically plural authority when it comes to the constitutional 
amendment process.  In addition, since this model of constitu-
tional rigidity produced by the Kosovo Constitution is a coun-
ter-majoritarian mechanism, one could say that it lacks domes-
tic legitimacy.29  Nevertheless, popular participation would be 
allowed in a legislative procedure, which offers the people 
somewhat of a role in the legislative process.  However, the Ko-
sovo Constitution dismisses the possibility for referendums in 
cases of vital laws,30
                                                 
27 This is a normal condition for states that establish constitutions that 
provide power-sharing governance (especially in ethnically divided societies), 
see generally Arend Lijphart, Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, 15 
J. DEMOCRACY 96 (2004). 
 which, therefore, shows that the Constitu-
tion and the Constitutional Court’s rulings interpreting the 
Constitution cannot be depopularized or deimmunized in the 
legislative process either.  The idea of prohibiting direct popu-
lar participation in constitutional amendment processes stands 
in harmony with the principles of consociation or power shar-
28 This argument stands in conformity with the general claim made by 
LIJPHART, supra note 3, at 230. 
29 The problem of domestic legitimacy is a long argued phenomenon that 
has followed the Constitution of Kosovo since its adoption, see Marko, supra 
note 8, at 449;  WELLER, supra note 8, at 258.  
30 See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO June 15, 2008, art. 81, 
available at http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Constitu-
tion.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf. 
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ing,31 with Kosovo being an internationally promoted state that 
must follow power sharing mechanisms.32
Fourth, one can question whether there is any part of the 
Constitution that cannot be subject to the amendment process.  
Doctrinally, many argue that, in general, constitutions should 
be amendable, however, some parts should be harder to amend 
than others.
 
33  The Kosovo Constitution through Article 144.3, 
sets forth that the adoption of a proposed constitutional 
amendment can be considered undertaken “only after the Pres-
ident of the Assembly of Kosovo has referred the proposed 
amendment to the Constitutional Court for a prior assessment 
that the proposed amendment does not diminish any of the 
rights and freedoms set forth in Chapter II of this Constitu-
tion.”34 Though Article 144.3 is not explicitly made to form part 
of the amendment process, it, both logically and legally, touch-
es on and influences the amendment process as well. Therefore, 
in light of Article 144.3, one would argue that Chapter II of the 
Kosovo Constitution could not be subject to a constitutional 
amendment that lessens rights, therefore leading to the argu-
ment that Chapter II of the Constitution is not amendable.35
                                                 
31 For more on power-sharing systems of governance, see generally AREND 
LIJPHART, THE POLITICS OF ACCOMMODATION: PLURALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN 
THE NETHERLANDS (1968);  Arend Lijphart, Consociational Democracy: The 
Views of Arend Lijphart and Collected Criticisms, POL. SCI. REVIEWER [143] 
available at http://www.mmisi.org/pr/15_01/schendelen.pdf;  AREND LIJPHART, 
DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION (1977);  Arend 
Lijphart, Consociation and Federation: Conceptual and Empirical Links, 12 
CANADIAN J. POL. SCI. 499 (1981);  AREND LIJPHART, CONFLICT AND 
COEXISTENCE IN BELGIUM: THE DYNAMICS OF A CULTURALLY DIVIDED SOCIETY 
(1981);  AREND LIJPHART, THINKING ABOUT DEMOCRACY: POWER-SHARING AND 
MAJORITY RULE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2008).  
 In 
32 See HENRY H. PERRITT, THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE FOR KOSOVO: A 
CHRONICLE OF THE AHTISAARI PLAN 1 (2010);  WELLER, supra note 8, at 39;  
Tunheim, supra note 4, at 376-77. 
33 See Elai Katz, On Amending Constitutions: The Legality and Legitima-
cy of Constitutional Entrenchment, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 251, 255 
(1996). 
34 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO June 15, 2008, art. 144, §3, 
available at http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Constitut-
ion.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf. 
35 The German Basic Law, for instance, does not allow the amendment 
principles within articles 1 and 20, see GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE 
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 
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view of Article 144.3, therefore, there is a hierarchy of norms 
within the Constitution itself, with Chapter II being unamend-
able,36 if the amendment concerned lessens rights.  Since the 
Constitution gives Chapter II a special role and having argued 
that this is the only unamendable part of the Constitution, it 
has a higher hierarchy in the system of norms within the Con-
stitution.  This, therefore, builds upon the idea that Chapter II 
of the Constitution remains untouchable by any amendment, 
whereas the constitutional rigidity has no meaning in terms of 
the Chapter concerned.37
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGIDITY AND SEPARATION OF 
POWERS FROM THE KOSOVO CONSTITUTION’S 
PERSPECTIVE  
  
Having argued that the Constitution of Kosovo is rather 
rigid, and having analysed the morphology of the rigidity con-
cerned, we now embark on the impact and/or outcomes that the 
constitutional rigidity in Kosovo will deliver.  Therefore, in this 
section we question the significance and outcomes of constitu-
tional rigidity in face of the model of separation of powers es-
tablished by the Kosovo Constitution. Prior to embarking on 
the debate of constitutional rigidity versus separation of pow-
ers in Kosovo’s case, it is worth noting that Ferreres-Comella 
has built a rather interesting and grounded argument on the 
                                                                                                             
1949, BGBl. LXXIX (Ger.). 
36 The same can be seen in the Bosnia and Herzegovina Constitution, 
“[n]o amendment to this Constitution may eliminate or diminish any of the 
rights and freedoms referred to in Article II of this Constitution or alter the 
present paragraph.”  BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA CONSTITUTION Dec. 1, 1995, 
art. 10 ¶ 2, available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/bk00000_.html.  
37 The Constitution of Kosovo recognizes the prevalence of Ahtisaari Set-
tlement over itself. However, many would say that only the Constitution of 
Kosovo could be seen as a groundnorm of Kosovo’s legal order. The Ahtisaari 
Settlement, on the other hand, though established by the Constitution as 
having supremacy over the Constitution, could be nevertheless dismissed 
through a constitutional amendment. If the latter would be the case, then the 
provision of the Constitution regulating the status of Ahtisaari Settlement 
and its prevalence could not be seen as unamendable. Dren Doli & Fisnik Ko-
renica, What About the Kosovo Constitution: Is There Anything Special? Dis-
cussing the Groundnorm, the Sovereignty and the Consociational Model of 
Employed Democracy, 4 VIENNA INT’L CONST. L.J. (forthcoming 2010). 
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debate concerned.  Ferreres-Comella argues that, in parliamen-
tary systems of governance, like most of the European coun-
tries, a rigid constitution would deliver a supplementary role 
for the constitutional court: that of counterbalancing the two 
other branches of government.  In fact, argues Ferreres-
Comella, since in a parliamentary system of governance the 
party or coalition holding the majority of seats in the parlia-
ment has no real control over the government, there is no real 
control that could come from the parliament over the govern-
ment.  Therefore, the control from the legislative branch vis-à-
vis the government would not nevertheless “harm” its perfor-
mance or counterbalance its work, or it does not exist at all. 
The only way to somehow oppose the government in parliamen-
tary governance is through the opposition parties in parlia-
ment.  Hence, in parliamentary systems of governance, argues 
Ferreres-Comella, the constitutional courts, and generally the 
judiciary, must take the role of balancing the executive-
legislative realm.  In this context, a rigid constitution, would 
strengthen the role of the constitutional court in interpreting 
the constitution in a way that counterbalances the politicized 
work of the executive-legislative realm, while allowing the lat-
ter to have no likelihood of changing the constitution as a way 
for surpassing the constitutional court’s rulings.38
The Kosovo Constitution has established a rather pure 
parliamentary system of governance,
 With this in 
mind, one wonders if the constitutional rigidity in Kosovo could 
play the same role in face of the executive-legislative realm.  To 
develop an analysis over this, we must first analyze the model 
of separation of powers established by the Kosovo Constitution.  
39
                                                 
38 See generally Víctor Ferreres-Comella, A Defense of Constitutional Ri-
gidity, Analisi e Diritto 2000, 45, available at http://www.giuri.unige.it/in-
tro/dipist/digita/filo/testi/analisi_2000/ferreres.pdf (describing rigidity of the 
Federal Constitution). 
 with the establishment 
of the separation of powers principle.  The country is headed by 
a President, who is appointed by Parliament once an absolute 
majority of votes in Parliament is reached in the third round.  
The executive branch is held by a government, which is ap-
pointed by Parliament once an absolute majority of votes (50% 
39 See Marko, supra note 8, at 444.  
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+ one vote) is obtained.  The legislative branch is held by the 
unicameral Parliament, which consists of 120 MPs.  The judi-
ciary is held by the regular courts, and the constitutional court.  
As far as the relationship between the legislative and executive 
branches, the Kosovo Constitution provides for a relationship 
that is based on the coalition of parties holding the govern-
ment.  In this context, the President of the Republic and the 
Government are a product of an agreement between the coali-
tion partners or the party holding the majority of seats in Par-
liament.40  In view of this, the control of Parliament towards 
the government and the President of the Republic is neverthe-
less practically impossible since any decision in the Parliament 
would need to be made with votes from the MPs coming from 
the party or coalition of parties holding the Government and 
the President.  Hence, legislative control, other than that by 
the opposition in Parliament is impossible in the practical con-
text, though Parliament is constitutionally authorized to con-
trol the Government.41 To this extent, the model of separation 
of powers provided by the Kosovo Constitution practically and 
politically allows a “marriage” between the Government, the 
President of the Republic, and the absolute majority of MPs,42
Generally, constitutional rigidity in Kosovo provides for a 
strong Constitutional Court, whose rulings cannot be easily 
counterbalanced or altered by a constitutional amendment.  In 
this context, since a constitutional amendment would be very 
difficult to pass given the double supermajorities required, the 
rulings of Kosovo’s Constitutional Court remain the only route 
for interpreting the Constitution.  In view of this, constitutional 
rigidity in Kosovo puts the Constitutional Court in a very po-
 
who are bestowed with the right to take almost any decision 
exercising defined legislative powers.  In this regard, therefore, 
one questions whether the rigid nature of the Kosovo Constitu-
tion has any role in the relationship between the executive-
legislative realm and the Constitutional Court. 
                                                 
40 Doli & Korenica, supra note 18, at 74-80.  
41 See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO June 15, 2008, art. 65, 
available at http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Constitut-
ion.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf. 
42 See Doli & Korenica, supra note 18, at 63.  
18 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol. 2:6 
2011] 
 
werful position and, most importantly, makes it fundamentally 
difficult to overrule a decision of the Court through a constitu-
tional amendment or through a legislative or popular vote.  
With this in mind, the Kosovo’s Constitutional Court practical-
ly enjoys the power to decide what the constitution means and 
allows no room for political revenge.  This would mean that the 
Constitutional Court would have the power to make “factual” 
amendments to the Constitution, as opposed to formal ones.  In 
this regard, the Constitutional Court’s rulings constitute fac-
tual amendments to the Constitution, and as such, would be 
more open to non-parliamentary interests, since the judicial ac-
tivity of the Court will be based, among others, on the claims of 
the parties standing before it.   
Following this argument, therefore, one should ask if con-
stitutional rigidity has as a result a role in the model of separa-
tion of powers established by the Constitution.  In this regard, 
as argued above, since the Kosovo Constitution provides for a 
rather pure parliamentary model of governance, the “marriage” 
between the executive and legislative branches is somehow im-
possible to be controlled by the parliamentary opposition.  
Hence, constitutional rigidity offers Kosovo’s Constitutional 
Court the power to counterbalance and control the constitutio-
nality of actions by the Government, Parliament and President, 
which are nevertheless instruments of the party or coalition of 
parties holding the majority of seats in Parliament.  In such 
circumstances, we argue that Kosovo’s Constitutional Court en-
joys the power to control the Government, Parliament, or Pres-
ident of the Republic, while no other political or non-political 
actors would have the power to do so vigorously. 43
                                                 
43 For a broader view on the constitutional provisions regulating the posi-
tion of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo, see Fisnik Korenica, Pointing the 
Rule-of-Law in a Transnational Polity: The Case of Kosovo’s Law on the Con-
stitutional Court, [Vol 10] issue 3 CONTEMP. ISSUES IN L. 183, 187 (2010);  
Dren Doli & Fisnik Korenica, Kosovar Constitutional Court’s Jurisdiction: 
Searching for Strengths and Weaknesses, 11 German L.J. 803, 809 (2010), 
available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol11-No8/PDF_Vol_11_-
No_08_803-836_Kosovo%20Context_Doli%20&%20Korencia%20FINAL.pdf. 
 Therefore, 
we argue that constitutional rigidity in Kosovo has given the 
Constitutional Court the opportunity and power to control the 
executive and legislative branches, which have a natural im-
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minence.  With this role, therefore, the Constitutional Court 
becomes the most powerful controlling and counterbalancing 
mechanism in the face of the partisan and political actors hold-
ing the executive and legislative branches.  Nevertheless the 
Constitutional Court’s power, is only possible thanks to the in-
ability of the legislature to amend the Constitution or “fight” 
the Constitutional Court’s rulings, which are naturally a prod-
uct of constitutional rigidity.44
The authority of the Constitutional Court is further empo-
wered through the constitutional provision, which gives it the 
right to control the constitutionality of procedures followed for 
adopting a constitutional amendment.  This certainly authoriz-
es the Court to ban an amendment if, in the view of Court, it 
was issued in a manner that is unconstitutional.
 
45  Besides 
this, one can say that comparative evidence shows that the 
broader the power of constitutional review the more freedom in 
the polity,46
To support the above-mentioned arguments and claims, we 
explain two essential Constitutional Court rulings, which test 
the accuracy of our claims.  First, in Rrustemi et al v. President 
of Republic, the Kosovo Constitutional Court, in a decision that 
conforms to the nature of a rigid constitution, ruled that the 
President of the Republic is violating the Constitution by si-
multaneously holding the post of President of the Republic and 
President of a political party.
 which strengthens the arguments made above. 
47 The President of the Republic, 
Mr. Fatmir Sejdiu, claimed that an earlier agreement with pol-
iticians allows the holding of the two posts simultaneously and 
thus is not a constitutional violation.48
                                                 
44 See John Ferejohn, The Politics of Imperfection: The Amendment of 
Constitutions, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 501, 510 (1997). 
  However, with the rul-
45 See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO June 15, 2008, art. 113, 
§ 3, cl. 4, available at http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Con-
stitution.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf. 
46 See Rafael La Porta et al., Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. OF 
POL. ECON. 445, 448 (2004), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/-
viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=florencio_lopez_de_silanes. 
47 For some more insight on the problem, see generally Doli & Korenica, 
supra note 18. 
48 See, for instance: Financial Times, 28 September 2010 Retrieved from: 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/e383958c-ca48-11df-a860-00144feab49a. See also: 
‘Thik pas shpine’. Koha Ditore Newspaper, 28 September 2010, citing Finan-
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ing, the Constitutional Court brought a new legal state of af-
fairs into the political scene, illustrating that partisan agree-
ments and parliamentary inability to seek the implementation 
of the Constitution are absolutely dismissed, therefore, leading 
into a rigidly controlled parliament and party scene from the 
Constitutional Court.49
Second, in Case No. KO 80/10, the Constitutional Court 
was asked to decide whether, according to the Constitution, the 
resignation of a directly elected mayor from a public post ef-
fected with the release of a statement to the media would be 
sufficient.  In fact, the Ministry for Local Governance has found 
itself in a dilemma concerning whether to recognize the resig-
nation of a local mayor from the incumbent-government party.  
The mayor claimed that with his return to office, he had an-
nulled the resignation.
  With the new ruling, therefore, party 
politics has changed directions, and overall there is no possibil-
ity for a constitutional amendment to counter the ruling.  
Hence, with the ruling in Rrustemi et al. v. President of Repub-
lic, the Constitutional Court has shown that it can review and 
control the work and the overall performance of the executive 
and legislative branches, including partisan agreements, thus 
allowing no place for the violation of the Constitution.  This, in 
turn, has limited the exploitation of the main institutions of the 
country by political parties and has changed the way in which 
coalition agreements will be viewed in the future.  All this, is 
based on the attitudes of constitutional rigidity, where revenge 
through a constitutional amendment over the Constitutional 
Court’s rulings would be impossible.   
50  The Constitutional Court, as a result, 
used a highly abstract notion in the Constitution to rule that 
the resignation of a public official, elected directly by the 
people, does not require confirmation from any institution, and 
such an action ends the mayor’s mandate.51
                                                                                                             
cial Times.  
   With this ruling, 
49 GYJKATA KUSHTETUESE [CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOSOVO] Sept. 28, 
2010, LËNDA NR. KI 47/10, available at http://www.gjk-ks.org/repository/-
docs/ki_47_10_shq_2.pdf (Kos.). 
50 See Presidenti kerkon sqarime ne rastin Qeskaj, (Aug. 18, 2010, 4:26 
PM CET), http://www.zeri.info/artikulli/1/1/9840/presidenti-kerkon-sqarime-
ne-rastin-qeskaj/. 
51 See GYJKATA KUSHTETUESE [CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOSOVO] RASTI 
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therefore, the Constitutional Court confirmed that it effectively 
controls the Government and Parliament, respectively since 
the executive branch and Parliament, who were on the mayor’s 
side, were unable to opine on this issue.  Therefore, both cases 
show how a rigid constitution has strengthened the Constitu-
tional Court’s role in controlling and reviewing the constitutio-
nality of the executive and legislative branches’ performance 
and acts, while ensuring that an act by Parliament to overcome 
a ruling would be almost impossible.  
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGIDITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
GUARANTEES FROM THE KOSOVO CONSTITUTION’S 
PERSPECTIVE 
In this section, the article embarks on examining the signi-
ficance of the relationship between constitutional rigidity and 
human rights in Kosovo.  We approach the issue from a legal 
constitutional point of view while pointing out the central is-
sues that are relevant in this regard.  Therefore, most practi-
cally, we question if the rigid nature of the Kosovo Constitution 
affects constitutional human rights.  To reach an answer, we 
approach the problem from two different perspectives and ana-
lyze the issue from the perspectives concerned.   
First, the human rights protections afforded by the Kosovo 
Constitution are rather numerous.52  It contains a number of 
rights ranging from political, social, economic, and dignity.  Be-
sides the list of human rights listed in the Constitution, the 
Constitution has constitutionalized a number of international 
human rights instruments.53
Second, the Constitution, especially in Chapter III, offers a 
  Through the constitutionaliza-
tion of the international instruments concerned, the Constitu-
tion has recognized to them a constitutional legal power.   
                                                                                                             
NR. KO 80/10, available at http://www.gjk-ks.org/repository/docs/aktgj-
ykim_rasti_%20ko_%2080_10.pdf (Kos.).  
52 For more information about the international human rights standards 
in the Constitution of Kosovo and their relevance in the state building 
process, see generally Tunheim, supra note 4. 
53 See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO June 15, 2008, art. 22, 
available at http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Constitut-
ion.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf.  
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number of special rights for ethnic communities in Kosovo, 
both at a personal and collective level.54  The Constitution has 
established a rather privileged position for ethnic communities 
that have a minority status in Kosovo.55
First, one questions whether constitutional rigidity has 
any effect on the issue of constitutional human rights in Koso-
vo.  The rulings of the Constitutional Court in the context of 
the interpretation of constitutional human rights will be 
deemed as final and to counterbalance those interpretations 
through legislative and/or executive action would be almost 
impossible.  On the other hand, the Constitutional Court would 
determine the scope and substance of the rights concerned and 
legislative actions challenging those rulings would be almost 
unachievable.  Since there is a list of ten international human 
rights instruments incorporated into the Constitution, the Con-
stitutional Court is able to make rulings that both respect and 
employ the substance of the international instruments con-
cerned.  This, therefore, leads to a type of constitutional justice 
that addresses the issue of human rights through the Court’s 
own case law on international human rights instruments, 
while allowing no room for the legislative branch to limit or 
ban the rights that have been guaranteed by the instruments 
concerned and the constitutional courts’ rulings. Overall, there-
fore, in the field of human rights, constitutional rigidity allows 
the Constitutional Court to produce powerful rulings, which 
cannot be overturned by the legislature and the Court’s refer-
ence to international human rights instruments will increase 
and internationalize the scope of human rights available in Ko-
sovo.  Constitutional rigidity, as such, will, first, allow the Con-
stitutional Court to determine through its own case law the 
substance and scope of rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
Constitution while, second, also hindering the idea of the legis-
  Hence, with these two 
issues, one would question if constitutional rigidity in Kosovo 
has any effect on constitutional human rights in general or on 
ethnic minority constitutional rights’ guarantees.  
                                                 
54 For a broader view of this, see generally Marko, supra note 8. 
55 For more information on ethnic minorities’ privileges in Kosovo, see 
generally id.; WELLER, supra note 8; MINORITY RIGHTS IN CENTRAL AND 
EASTERN EUROPE (Bernd Rechel, ed., 2009).  
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lature dealing with the definition of rights and constitutional 
principles of human rights. Additionally, thanks to the Consti-
tution’s rigid nature, the Constitutional Court’s “expanded” 
role with regard to human rights leads to more political free-
dom.56
Second, one would question if constitutional rigidity has a 
role with regard to ethnic minority constitutional rights in Ko-
sovo.  Besides being quite appealing, the rigid mechanism built 
within the Kosovo Constitution was primarily aimed at assur-
ing that ethnic minority rights and privileges remain unaf-
fected from majority rule.
   
57  Hence, constitutional rigidity in 
Kosovo would assure that no right or privilege at the personal 
or collective level guaranteed by the Constitution to ethnic mi-
norities in Kosovo would be hindered or interfered with unless 
the ethnic minority MPs themselves provide their assent.  This 
means that Parliament would only amend a constitutional 
right or freedom if the ethnic minority MPs themselves provide 
their assent for such an amendment.  Hence, constitutional ri-
gidity in Kosovo assures that ethnic minority rights and free-
doms guaranteed by the Constitution remain intact.  This as-
sures against any action by the majority MPs in Parliament 
and thus reduces concerns of the majority reducing ethnic mi-
nority rights and privileges.  In addition, this model of consti-
tutional rigidity makes the ethnic minority MPs themselves re-
sponsible for and capable of controlling and having the capacity 
to protect their electorate’s constitutional rights and freedoms.  
Moreover, the Constitutional Court is also responsible for mak-
ing sure that the chapter dedicated to human rights and privi-
leges remains unchanged by any constitutional amendment.58
                                                 
56 See La Porta, supra note 46, at 447. 
  
57 For more information on the ethnic minorities’ rights and freedoms in 
Kosovo see generally Emma Lantschner, Protection of Minority Communities 
in Kosovo: Legally Ahead for European Standards—Practically Still a Long 
Way to Go, 33 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 451 (2008). 
58 For a counter-majoritarian ruling of the Constitutional Court of Koso-
vo, which certainly follows a constitutional rigidity rationale, see generally 
GYJKATA KUSHTETUESE [CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOSOVO] Qemajl Kurtisi v. 
Municipal Assembly of Prizren, Mar. 18, 2010, CASE NO. KO 01/09, available 
at http://www.gjk-ks.org/repository/docs/ko_01_09_Ven_ang.pdf;  For a dis-
cussion of how public opinion disapproves of this, see generally Kundershto-
het Vendimi i Gjykates Kushtetuese per Emblemen e Prizrenit, Kosova Info 
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Overall, one could argue that the Kosovo Constitution’s bill of 
rights and the Constitutional Court’s case law have a counter-
majoritarian nature, which could boost popular opposition to it.  
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGIDITY, “EUROPEANIZATION,” AND 
UPDATING THE KOSOVO CONSTITUTION  
Rigid constitutions face problems with respect to the dy-
namism of societal and political affairs.  The problems con-
cerned relate to the fact that rigid constitutions are hard to 
amend, changes in societal and political affairs would require 
updated constitutional regulations.  Thus, constitutional rigidi-
ty makes it difficult for these constitutions to adapt to dynamic 
societal affairs, which would be best addressed from a constitu-
tional perspective.  In view of this problem, one should question 
whether there is any way of updating the Constitution of Koso-
vo.  Certainly, in constitutional regimes having a rigid nature 
this role rests with the Constitutional Court,59 which must in-
terpret and update constitutional rules.60
Therefore, in this section, we question whether the role of 
the Kosovan Constitutional Court in interpreting and uphold-
ing the “updated” character of the Constitution has any mean-
ing in terms of the overall constitutional openness.  
  
To start with, it is worth noting “… abstraction is neces-
                                                                                                             
(Prishtine), available at http://www.kosova.info/2010/03/kundershtohet-
vendimi-i-gjykates-kushtetuese-per-emblemen-e-prizrenit/. 
59 For example, the US Supreme Court decision of Marbury v. Madison, 
which establishes the doctrine of judicial review, shows that even without an 
amendment, the Court can create a “factual” amendment, see Walter Mur-
phy, McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence, Emeritus at Princeton Universi-
ty, Lecture at 2000 Harry Eckstein Lecture at Univ. of California at Irvine, 
Constitutional Interpretation as Constitutional Creation, available at 
http://www.democ.uci.edu/research/lecture%20series/murphy.php 
60 For a review of how the US Supreme Court has substantially altered 
the founding principles of the American Constitution by adapting them to so-
cietal changes, see generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES 
REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION (2006).  There is evidence that a third way of 
amending a constitution occurs in practice, namely the change of constitu-
tional principles through customs and political evolution, such as the practice 
of transferring the government from a monarchy to an elected government in 
Europe, see generally Roger D. Congleton, On the Durability of King and 
Council: The Continuum Between Dictatorship and Democracy, 12 CONST. 
POL. ECON. 193 (2001), available at http://rdc1.net/forthcoming/kingcon.pdf.  
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sary for a rigid Constitution to preserve its democratic legiti-
macy through time.”61
Article 53 of the Kosovo Constitution states “[h]uman 
rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by this Constitu-
tion shall be interpreted consistent with the court decisions of 
the European Court of Human Rights.”
 In view of this argument, one would 
question whether the nature of the Kosovo Constitution allows 
for vital rulings by the Constitutional Court.  It is quite hard to 
say whether the Kosovo Constitution is abstract enough to al-
low change over time.  However, in order to question the issue 
of dynamism with respect to the Constitutional Court’s role in 
updating the Constitution, we approach the issue by analyzing 
Article 53 of the Constitution.   
62  In light of Article 53, 
one can argue that the Constitutional Court’s rulings, with re-
gard to the interpretation of the substantive rights and free-
doms granted by the Constitution, must be kept in line with 
the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) case law.  
Therefore, the ECtHR’s case law is a mandatory reference for 
all interpretations by the Kosovan Constitutional Court as far 
as human rights are concerned.63
Based on Article 53 and the rigid character of the Kosovo 
Constitution, there are a number of consequences resulting 
from the Kosovan Constitutional Court’s role.  First, the Con-
stitutional Court is obliged to interpret the Constitution, not 
only on the basis of constitutional norms, but also on ECtHR 
case law.  Hence, the Kosovo Constitution is not a closed consti-
tution, rather it is fully open, and the Constitutional Court’s 
rulings must comply with the substance of ECtHR case law.
  
64
                                                 
61 Ferreres-Comella, supra note 38, at 50. 
   
62 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO June 15, 2008, art. 53, 
available at http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Constitut-
ion.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf. 
63 For more information on how the European Court of Human Rights’ 
rulings are implemented at the national level, see generally Eur. Comm. for 
Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on the Implementa-
tion of the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, 53d Sess., 
Doc. No. CDL-AD (2002) 34 (2002), available at http://www.venice.coe.-
int/docs/2002/CDL-AD(2002)034-e.asp.  
64 See GYJKATA KUSHTETUESE [CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOSOVO] Imer 
Ibrahimi and 48 other former employees of the Kosovo Energy Corporation v. 
49 Judgments of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kosovo, June 23, 2010, 
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Second, given the rigid character of the Constitution, the 
Constitutional Court is given the task of adapting the Consti-
tution to recent circumstances and societal affairs.  In view of 
this problem, therefore, the Constitutional Court will uphold 
the “updated” character of the Constitution because it is based 
on the dynamism of ECtHR case law,65
Third, since the Constitutional Court’s rulings will stand 
in harmony with ECtHR case law, then, the rulings concerned 
will “europeanize” the Kosovo Constitution.
 as required by Article 
53 of the Kosovo Constitution.  With this in mind, the Constitu-
tional Court, given the rigid nature of the Constitution and its 
crucial role in upholding the up-to-the-minute character of the 
hard-to-change Constitution, will interpret it on basis of 
ECtHR case law, which is rather up-to-date.   
66
CONCLUSION  
 The ‘Strasbourgi-
zation’ of the Constitutional Court’s rulings, which stand as fi-
nal and have constitutionally legal power, will produce a con-
stitutional regime that is updated on the basis of ECtHR case 
law, whereas the legislature would find itself incapable of over-
turning the Constitutional Court’s rulings with an amendment, 
thus making it impossible for the legislature to challenge the 
Constitutional Court’s rulings.  In effect, this results in the Ko-
sovo Constitution being ‘factually’ amended in accordance with 
the ECtHR’s perspective. 
This article has discussed constitutional rigidity from the 
perspective of Kosovan constitutional law.  In general, the ar-
ticle has argued that the Kosovo Constitution is a rigid one and 
that the amendment process is such that amendments are al-
lowed only if an ethnically-consented double supermajority is 
achieved.  
                                                                                                             
CASE NO. KI 40/09, available at http://www.gjk-ks.org/repository/docs/-
ki_40_09_ang_vendimi_meritor.pdf. 
65 For more information on ECtHR case law and its recent trend of dy-
namism, see generally FRANCIS G. JACOBS ET AL., THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS (5th ed., 2010). 
66 Some argue that ECtHR case law is a constitutional model for Europe, 
see STEVEN C. GREER, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: 
ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 171 (2006). 
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Initially, the article questioned the issue of constitutional 
rigidity from the perspective of scholarship.  Then, the article 
embarked on the particulars of the Kosovo Constitution.  The 
article described the manner in which a constitutional amend-
ment can be initiated, arguing that this right is monopolized by 
institutional actors.  In this context, the Kosovo Constitution’s 
amendment process is open to political initiatives, but closed to 
the people.  
The article then depicted the constitutional amendment 
adoption process. The article argued that the adoption of a con-
stitutional amendment is closed to popular initiatives, and that 
direct popular participation in no way exists.  Additionally, the 
amendment process requires a double supermajority in Par-
liament, namely, a supermajority of the entire Parliament and 
a supermajority of the MPs representing ethnic communities.  
Overall, the amendment process set by the Constitution is in 
some way counter-majoritarian, however, ethnically plural.  
The article shows that the Kosovo Constitution is a rather rigid 
one. 
Subsequently, the article discussed the issue of constitu-
tional rigidity in face of the model of separation of powers set 
by the Constitution, arguing that with the pure parliamentary 
model of governance that Kosovo has, constitutional rigidity 
will precondition the Constitutional Court to have power over 
the executive and legislative branches, whereas the rigidity as 
such would practically immobilize Parliament from putting a 
constitutional amendment in place easily.   
Next, the article discussed the issue of constitutional rigid-
ity in terms of human rights in Kosovo, arguing that constitu-
tional rigidity will give the Constitutional Court authority to 
determine through its own case-law the substance of constitu-
tional human rights, while allowing no legislative counterbal-
ance in this regard.  
Finally, the article questioned the issue of dynamism of the 
Kosovo Constitution in the context of the rigidity, arguing that 
the authority to update the Constitution rests with the Consti-
tutional Court, whereas on basis of Article 53, the Court is pre-
conditioned to ‘Strasbourgize’ its case law. 
In conclusion, the Kosovo Constitution is rather rigid, and 
28 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol. 2:6 
2011] 
 
this authoritatively strengthens the role and authority of the 
Constitutional Court.  On basis of this, the Court will, through 
its own case law, adapt the Constitution so that it conforms 
with current societal needs and the balancing aims vis-à-vis 
the executive and legislative branches.  In addition, despite the 
fact that constitutional rigidity in Kosovo has a counter-
majoritarian nature, it might produce many counterbalancing 
results in terms of political or partisan interests.  
